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What Is a Form-of-Life?: Giorgio 
Agamben and the Practice of Poverty 
Steven DeCaroli 
What is your aim in philosophy? 
To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, I, 309 
What I would like to attempt in this chapter, which at first might 
seem a simple matter, is to determine the meaning of what Giorgio 
Agamben calls a 'form-of-life' and to make clear how its tech-
nical sense differs from the term 'form of life', which bears a 
slightly different inscription, and in relation to which form-of-
life remains in continual tension.1 Although both terms have been 
part of Agamben's lexicon for over two decades,2 the manner in 
which they have been discussed in the secondary literature remains 
unconvincing - in part because these considerations are often 
limited to simple repetitions of Agamben's sparse formulation. But 
this is not entirely the fault of Agamben's readership. There is a 
great deal of ambiguity, if not outright inconsistency, in the manner 
in which Agamben deploys the terms and, until quite recently, their 
presentation has been, somewhat notoriously, uncertain. 
In order to comprehend the strategic function these terms play in 
Agamben's thought we must, however, approach them obliquely 
because it is not possible to adequately understand what is meant 
by form-of-life unless we first come to terms with the role that 
the concept of necessity plays in Agamben's analysis of juridical 
power. As will become clear in what follows, Agamben's investi-
gation into the limits of legal authority is guided by his treatment 
of necessity, a concept that plays a central role in two pivotal 
texts, State of Exception and The Highest Poverty, which, despite 
their evident differences, in fact mirror each other quite closely.3 
Since it is within the pages of the more recent of these two books, 
The Highest Poverty, that Agamben provides his fullest treatment 
207 
208 Agamben and Radical Politics 
to date of the positive content of form-of-life - an undertaking 
announced in the book's subtitle- it will serve as the focus of this 
study.4 
Two necessities 
The Greeks gave the name Ananke to the personification of neces-
sity and in Orphic theology she appears as the wife of Demiurgus 
and as the mother of both the Moerae (the fates) and Heimarmene 
(destiny). In her lap rests a spindle around which the world revolves 
and we are told that her power was irresistible, even to gods - a 
view corroborated by Simonides of Ceos who, in a passage cited 
by Plato in the Protagoras, tells us that 'against necessity [ananke] 
not even the gods make war'. 5 But if necessity forces the hand of 
both mortals and gods, she does not do so alone. For according 
to Pausanias' Descriptio Graeciae, there was a sanctuary on the 
north slope of the Acrocorinth dedicated not only to Ananke but 
also to Bia (violence), where the two goddesses were worshipped 
together in the same shrine - a shrine, he adds, which it was 'not 
customary to enter'. 6 
The proximity of necessity and violence arises, of course, in 
the context of biological survival where, in accordance with 
natural law (ius naturale), the use of force to secure basic neces-
sities is justified. It is, however, in the domain of politics that this 
relation has proven most consequential. When Aristotle turns 
his attention to the topic of the polis, for instance, he begins not 
with politics itself but with a discussion of the oikos, the private 
realm of the household, which, in addition to being responsible 
for procuring the biological necessities of daily living, serves 
both as the backdrop against which the polis will be defined 
and as the domain of necessity from which the political order 
will continually seek to distance itself. Likewise, when, in a brief 
essay from I993, Agamben states that 'Political power as we 
know it ... always founds itself - in the last instance - on the 
separation of a sphere of naked life [nuda vita] from the context 
of the forms of life'/ it is to this primary political division of 
oikos from polis that he refers. What we have is an attempt to 
exclude from the realm of political life both the constraints of 
necessity that oblige human action to conform to the require-
ments of survival and the violence that accompanies this pursuit, 
not only because every necessity conceals the potential for an 
-~-~.· 
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emergency, but because there is simply no necessity that law can 
hope to command. 
But despite every effort, the absolute separation of polis from 
oikos has never held fast. The necessity that politics seeks to 
exclude finds its way back into the polis, and it does so for two 
reasons- first, because the polis cannot exist without the necessary 
work of the oikos and, second, because the logic of political life 
generates formidable necessities of its own. As we will see, these 
two reasons correspond not only with two distinct types of neces-
sity, but also designate two points at which the rule of law reaches 
its operational limit. 
The demands of biological life have always, from time to time, 
erupted within the polis and when raw necessity confronts the 
juridical order, when the need for survival impinges upon the aims 
of politics, the force of law begins to deteriorate. It is well known 
that, for Aristotle, membership in the polis was possible only 
through the strict exclusion of those (women, slaves, etc.) whose 
lives remained tethered to the labour required for survival, and 
therefore to the oikos, and so it is not surprising that it is from out 
of their ranks that the polis first encounters its antithesis, that is to 
say, the poor- the name we give to the appearance of biological 
necessity within the borders of the state. It is with this in mind that 
Aristotle tells us, 'poverty is the parent of revolution and crime', 8 
for under conditions of material scarcity the legal order gives way 
to the demands of biological need, giving full meaning to the Latin 
adage, often repeated in medieval legal literature, 'necessity knows 
no law' (necessitas dat legem non ipsa accipit).9 
But the appearance of poverty is not the only manner in which 
the separation of the oikos from the polis reveals its fragility, for 
the state is concerned with its own survival as well. The violence 
that political life sought to avoid by excluding necessity from 
its domain reappears in the form of necessities born within the 
political order itself - a purely political form of survival, which 
concerns not the ability to live but the capacity to rule. When, 
in his seminar of I977-8, Michel Foucault introduces the notion 
of necessity in relation to what the seventeenth century knew as 
coup d'Etat, it is this second form of necessity to which he refers. 
Following Giovanni Palazzo's early definition, coup d'Etat refers 
not to the seizure of state power by outside forces, but to the state 
'acting of itself on itself' in response to a necessity that is 'above 
the law', and it is 'in the name of the state's salvation', that is 
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to say, its survival, that the state undertakes the suspension of 
law and legality.10 Politics, Foucault concludes, is therefore, 'not 
something that has to fall within a form of legality or a system of 
laws. Politics is concerned with something else, although at times, 
when it needs them, it uses laws as an instrument. Politics is con-
cerned with necessity.'11 What we encounter here is necessity born 
of the state itself, emerging from the need to preserve legitimacy 
so as to retain the authority to rule. When political life appears 
on the verge of collapse, when the ability to extend force to law 
is placed in jeopardy, the political order begins to mirror the bio-
logical order by turning not to law, because the law's viability is 
precisely what is in question, but to extra-legal forms of legitimacy 
and to violence: 'When necessity demands it,' Foucault writes, 
'raison d'Etat becomes coup d'Etat, and then it is violent.'12At this 
point, however, the parallel between the biological order and the 
political order comes to an end because, whereas life encounters 
biological necessity whenever objective conditions give rise to the 
risk of death, the state confronts political necessity strictly by way 
of a decision - thereby disclosing the essential meaning of Carl 
Schmitt's famous definition of sovereignty, according to which the 
'sovereign is he who decides on the exception'.13 
Two investigations 
Any interpretation of the political meaning of necessity, then, must 
begin with the peculiar fact that necessity stands on opposite ends 
of the law, positioned, as it were, at the two poles where law 
reaches its operational limit. On one side there is biological neces-
sity, the point at which law must abdicate its authority in favour 
of biological survival, and it is in this sense that the law is con-
strained by biological necessity. And on the other side there is the 
loss of political legitimacy, the point at which law is stripped of 
its general capacity to command, and it is in this sense that law 
is constrained by the requirements of political necessity. On the 
one hand, we encounter conditions leading to necessary use (usus 
necessitatis), and on the other we encounter conditions that give 
rise to a state of necessity (status necessitatis). Although there 
is a risk of oversimplification, Agamben's ongoing investigations 
into the limits of juridical power can be understood as proceeding 
down both these lines of inquiry. 
The first investigation leads us to State of Exception, which, as 
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the title indicates, concerns status necessitatis or, more specifically, 
the nature of authority (auctoritas) insofar as it retains the power 
to suspend law. Agamben's analysis demonstrates that authority is 
not a,nly a power that persists in the absence of the law, but coin-
cides with the life of the sovereign in whose person life and law are 
made indistinguishable. Authority is 'what remains of law if law 
is wholly suspended', and in this sense authority is 'not law but 
life', a 'law that blurs at every point with life'. 14 Being a living law, 
the sovereign, the auctor, makes the political emergency possible 
by making political necessity intelligible, that is, by entangling 
the survival of the state with the survival of the ruler. And insofar 
as a political emergency is possible, authority is revealed to be 
a dependent power not only because political life depends upon 
material necessities provided by the private domain of the house-
hold, but because authority depends also on cognitive necessities 
(belief and obedience) furnished by a population. 
And the second investigation leads us, of course, to The Highest 
Poverty, which considers usus necessitatis and the role it plays 
in monastic communities that sought, through the practice of 
poverty, to live life beyond law. In this text Agamben asks: to 
what extent is it possible to envision a viable community premised 
neither on sovereignty nor on the juridical allocation of rights? 
Are there historical precedents for this type of community? And, if 
so, what type of life - what form of life - characterises this com-
munity and makes extra-legal existence possible? If strength of 
authority is directly proportional to the way of living (form of life) 
that sustains it, then the aim of Agamben's most recent work is to 
formulate a way of life (form-of-life) wherein authority is rendered 
unsustainable. 
Monastic rule 
In the opening pages of The Highest Poverty, which are devoted 
to a discussion of the birth of monastic rule during the fourth and 
fifth centuries, Agamben explains that his investigation will be an 
attempt, by means of a study of monasticism, 'to construct a form-
of-life', a life 'that is linked so closely to its form that it proves to be 
inseparable from it'Y Although, according to Agamben's analysis, 
monastic communities ultimately fail to achieve this inseparability, 
the persistence with which they repeatedly approach its realisation 
is nonetheless instructive. Of paramount importance is the novel 
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manner in which later forms of monasticism, and in particular 
the Franciscan Order, confronted the problem of the relationship 
between rule and life, collapsing the distinction in a way that was 
decidedly not achieved through either perfect obedience under 
law or strict conformity to the duties of office - subjects Agamben 
explores in a subsidiary text on liturgy and divine office, Opus 
Dei.16 As we will see, what makes the Franciscan Order significant 
is the manner in which it bridged the disconnection between, on 
the one hand, the demands spelled out in the rules and, on the 
other hand, the imperfect ability of the monastic community to 
comply with those demands. Whereas other monastic communi-
ties accomplished this reconciliation between rule and life through 
an extreme intensification of monastic discipline, the Franciscans 
did very much the reverse. As Agamben explains: 
The traditional juridical idea of the observance of a precept is here 
reversed. Not only is it the case that the Friar Minor does not obey the 
rule, but live it -with an even more extreme reversal, it is life that is to 
be applied to the norm and not the norm to lifeP 
Consequently, the 'most precious legacy' of Franciscanism is, as 
will become clear in what follows, precisely 'how to think a form-
of-life, a human life entirely removed from the grasp of the law' 
and therefore how to establish a community 'no longer on the level 
of doctrine and law, but on the level of life'.18 
According to Agamben's presentation, the earliest monastic 
rules were not juridical texts but rather codes of conduct, which, 
by being something other than law, reconfigured the relation 
between norm and life. 'What is a rule, if it seems to be mixed up 
with life without remainder? And what is a human life, if it can 
no longer be distinguished from the rule?'19 The manner in which 
Agamben formulates these questions is undoubtedly intended to 
invite a comparison with the special relationship that the sover-
eign maintains with the law, thereby invoking the central theme of 
State of Exception, namely, the sovereign whose authority makes 
his life indistinguishable from law. Likewise, quoting Candido 
Mazon's Las reglas de los religiosos, Agamben explains that the 
rules of monastic orders 'are not truly laws or precepts in the strict 
sense of the term', but neither are they reducible to 'mere advice 
that leaves the monks at liberty to follow it or not' .20 Here too 
we find a conspicuous parallel with State of Exception insofar as 
.,,~-~1; 
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auctoritas, according to Theodor Mommsen's definition, which 
Agamben cites, is 'more than advice and less than command, an 
advice which one may not safely ignore' .21 
Roughly speaking, then, there is an inverse parallel between 
monastic rule and sovereign authority, between regula and auc-
toritas. While monastic rules guided the lives of monks who lived 
outside the law and who refused every right furnished by the jurid-
ical order, sovereign authority grounds the force of law insofar 
as it survives in the person of the sovereign who exists beyond it. 
Monastic rules, like authority, were not laws and did not attain 
their efficacy by juridical means, yet they functioned very differ-
ently from sovereign authority insofar as they did not serve as the 
foundation for a legal system. Instead of joining the obligated to 
an elevated source of power, as in the case of law, monastic rules 
bonded together (each-to-each) those who had given themselves 
over to this obligation, thereby creating a common life over which 
rules had no binding claim. The form of life (forma vitae) invoked 
by the rule, then, is a common life constituted absent the imposi-
tion of law, and all monastic regula must be understood in these 
terms. 'Common life', Agamben maintains, 'is not the object that 
the rule must constitute and govern. On the contrary ... it is the 
rule that seems to be born from "cenoby" [common life].'22 
The notion of a forma vitae championed by the Franciscans is, 
however, considerably older than Franciscanism itself and can be 
found as far back as Cicero, Seneca and Quintilian - a lineage 
that brings with it synonymous meanings that accompany forma: 
imago, exemplar, exemplum. The sense of a model or an example 
that characterised these earlier traditions carried over into the 
Franciscan forma vitae, and understood in these terms the phrase 
'form of life' may also be rendered 'example of life' or 'paradigm 
of life' since a form of life is that type (typos) of life that can serve 
as an example of a way of living - which is precisely how we 
ought to understand the monastic rule, especially when we recall 
that the supreme rule for Francis was not a code but the concrete, 
exemplary life of Christ. 'One could not say more clearly that if a 
life (the life of Christ) is to furnish the paradigm of the rule, then 
the rule is transformed into life, becomes forma vivendi et regula 
vivifica. '23 
'Living according to a form', Agamben tells us, 'undoubtedly 
implies, according to a frequent meaning of the term forma in 
medieval Latin, an exemplary relation with others',24 but, he 
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reminds us, 'the logic of the example is anything but simple and 
does not coincide with the application of a general law'.25 The 
peculiar logic of the example, about which Agamben has said 
a great deal, fits nicely here for there is, after all, no separation 
between the example and the thing it exemplifies. The example is 
always already an instance of its exemplarity and so it is impos-
sible to cleanly distinguish between the example as a rule and the 
example as instance of adherence to that rule. The example exer-
cises a normative force without relying on law and so Sulpicius 
Severus can write, regarding the embodiment of monastic regula-
tion, 'Be a form of living for all, be an example.'26 
The great insight of the monastics, then, was to refuse to 
produce on top of common life, which is by its nature precari-
ous, a legal framework that purports to protect, stabilise and 
defend it, because the cost of this stabilisation is a legal logic that 
permits the type of exclusion that political order seems to require 
and which Agamben's famous figure of Homo sacer exemplifies. 
Ironically perhaps, and despite its religious nature, Agamben finds 
in monasticism a community characterised by a refusal of author-
ity, a refusal to recognise and thereby make operative the work 
of law and sovereignty. The monks' refusal to employ legal codes 
as a mechanism for binding community was therefore neither the 
result of de facto illegality, nor of a rebellious refusal to obey, but 
of a form of life that rendered juridical authority inoperative, a life 
characterised by a type of poverty which was not only material 
but juridical. 
Abdicatio iuris 
It is no surprise that when Agamben takes up the question of the 
relation between forma vitae and the law, he begins with poverty, 
and specifically the altissima paupertas (highest poverty) of 
Francis. From the beginning, the Friars Minor stressed not merely 
the embrace of material poverty but, in a move that produced 
tension with the Papacy, the abdication of every right (abdicatio 
omnis iuris), which is to say, the adoption of juridical poverty. 
'What the Franciscans never tire of confirming', we are told, 'is the 
lawfulness for the brothers of making use of goods without having 
any right to them (neither of property nor of use).m Bonagratia, 
who is among the first to develop the notion of use without right 
by placing the Franciscan vow of poverty in the context of neces-
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sity, argues that, 'as the horse has de facto use but not property 
rights over the oats that it eats, so the religious who has abdicated 
all property has the simple de facto use [usum simplicem facti] of 
bread,,wine, and clothes'.28 While Francis's devotion to animals 
is undoubtedly implied in this formulation, as Agamben points 
out, animals are not here brought into the human fold; rather, 
the brothers are 'equated with animals from the point of view 
of the law'.29 Just as in the state of innocence, 'human beings had 
the use of things but not ownership, so also the Franciscans ... 
can renounce all property rights while maintaining, however, the 
de facto use of things' .3° The separation of ownership from use, 
implicit in the abdication iuris, therefore constituted 'the essential 
apparatus that the Franciscans use to technically define the pecu-
liar condition that they call "poverty"'.31 
Under the papacy of John XXII, however, the possibility of 
separating ownership and use is called into question and the 
Pontiff's pronouncements on the subject, put forth in the bull 
Ad conditorem canonum, marks a critical moment in the history 
of Franciscanism. The Curia's argument hinged on isolating a 
sphere of conduct wherein the separation of use from ownership 
is impossible. This was accomplished by claiming, in the case of 
consumable goods such as food or water, that use entails the nec-
essary destruction of the thing consumed. Therefore, '[t]he purely 
ontological problem is whether a use that consists only in abuse 
(that is, in destruction) can exist and be possessed other than by 
right of ownership.'32 Whereas the Friars wished to preserve a 
right of usage in the absence of ownership, and so claimed to use 
out of necessity, the Curia argued that necessary use and, indeed, 
all forms of use that involve consumption imply a de facto right 
of ownership. 
The Franciscans, of course, responded to this critique and 
Agamben articulates the monastic position by citing both Hugh 
of Digne and Ockham. According to Hugh's De finibus pauper-
tatis, natural law 'prescribes that everyone have use of the things 
necessary to their conservation, but does not obligate them in any 
way to ownership'.33 Hugh's strategy for distinguishing use from 
ownership rested, therefore, on the distinction between natural 
law and positive law, between quid facti and quid iuris. He tells 
us, for instance, that conserving one's life through the use of food 
and clothing does not constitute ownership but rather simple use, 
because the right of ownership can be renounced, whereas the 
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right to use in the interest of survival cannot be. The problem 
with this formulation, however, is that by defining simple use in 
opposition to ownership, Hugh defines it in entirely legal terms. 
Necessary use is anchored in the theory of natural law which posi-
tive law recognises, thereby tethering it to a legal logic and placing 
Hugh's presentation in the awkward position of having to present 
in juridical terms the right to have no rights. 
Ockham defended the Franciscan position in a similar fashion 
by distinguishing between the natural right of use (which appears 
when one enters a state of necessity measured against the needs of 
survival) and the positive right of use (which is entirely the result 
of law and legal dispensation). Though they retained no positive 
right to the things they used, the Friars nevertheless claimed a 
natural right limited to cases of extreme necessity: 
Brothers have permission to use things for a time other than a time 
of extreme necessity [pro alia tempore quam pro tempore necessitatis 
extremae], but they do not have any right of using at all except for the 
time of extreme necessity. 34 
Whereas monks had permission to use things when it was not 
necessary to do so, they did not have a right to use those things 
unless they did so under conditions of necessity, because in such 
cases their actions assumed a legal status (via natural law), thereby 
becoming a matter of right. As Agamben puts it, 'They have 
renounced all property and every faculty of appropriating, but not 
the natural right of use, which is,. insofar as it is a natural right, 
unrenounceable. '35 Thus, 
[i]t is not the rule so much as the state of necessity that is the appara-
tus through which they seek to neutralise law and at the same time to 
assure themselves an extreme relationship with it (in the form of ius 
naturale).36 
Although Ockham strayed into the same trap as Hugh, justify-
ing the Franciscan notion of use in terms that are entirely juridical, 
he had, in a sense, flipped the relation between law and neces-
sity that characterised monastic life. 37 Under normal conditions, 
where positive law is generally applied, the Friars Minor had no 
legally enforceable right to use, but in cases of extreme necessity, 
as Ockham argues, the brothers 'recover a relationship with law'38 
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- but in this case it is natural law, not positive law. 'Necessity, 
which gives the Friars Minor a dispensation from the rule, restores 
(natural) law to them; outside the state of necessity, they have no 
relationship with the law.'39 Thus, what for others is the normal 
condition of living under rights extended by law became for the 
monastics an exceptional state. Monastic life was lived outside of 
the law, coming into contact with the law only when conditions 
were necessary for survival, whereas others live continually under 
the law and begin to exit the law only in an emergency - 'what for 
others is an exception becomes for them a form of life'. 40 Monastic 
use and legal use overlap or come into contact only in this very 
narrow condition known as necessary use -usus necessitatis- and 
so, Agamben concludes, '[u]se and the state of necessity are the 
two extremes that define the Franciscan form of life.'41 
Abdicatio officium 
But since, as we saw above, use and necessity are not limited to 
material or biological existence, but appear also in the more cir-
cumscribed context of political life, Agamben turns next to a con-
sideration of office (officium). What is important to understand 
here is that office is also a kind of property and therefore not only 
is it something that can be put to use, it is also something in rela-
tion to which one can be poor. Office is a type of status and, as 
with all status, what distinguishes it ontologically is a capacity to 
bring into existence, within a social domain, real powers and real 
effects. To hold an office, in other words, is to possess the power 
to transform some portion of social reality, which in the case of 
clerical office is best exemplified by the priestly power to perform 
the sacraments. 
A key procedural question arising from the power of religious 
office was whether sacraments performed by an unworthy priest 
were still valid. Holding firm to the integrity of the institution of 
offices, which was its prerogative to dispense, the Church answered 
the question affirmatively, claiming that a priest is merely the 
instrument of God. Monastics, however, held an entirely different 
view, claiming that monks are not given rights according to status, 
but in accordance with the life they lead. It was not, therefore, a 
matter of a person empowered by his office, the efficacy of which 
would thereby ultimately lie in an authority located external to the 
officeholder, transferred through officium, but of a person whose 
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meritorious disposition and spiritual attitude instantiated its own 
efficacy. 'To a life that receives its sense and its standing from the 
Office', Agamben explains, 'monasticism opposes the idea of an 
officium that has sense only if it becomes life.'42 
As was mentioned above regarding monastic rule, with which 
office is closely connected, earlier forms of monasticism attempted 
to solve the general problem arising from the disconnect between 
ideal conduct presented in the rule and actual monastic behaviour 
by creating a regula vitae, 'an unprecedented intensification of 
prayer and officium'43 in which the rules of devotion were so com-
pletely absorbed into their way of life that there was not a moment 
which was not given over to their fulfilment. Franciscanism, 
however, took a different path, substituting for regula vitae the 
idea of forma vitae; and this is 'not because it is constituted as an 
officium and a liturgy, nor because the law has for its object the 
relation between a life and its form, but precisely by virtue of its 
radical extraneousness to law and liturgy'. 44 Indeed, it stands to 
reason that a movement dedicated to living a life beyond the privi-
leges of right and ownership would shed any pretence to office 
which, insofar as it gains its effectiveness through legal status, is 
a species of property that the practice of poverty disables. Since 
divine office never came to define Franciscan identity, the Order 
stood in an extraneous relation to the Church and for this reason 
the development of the Order exhibited none of the anticlericalism 
common to other monastic movements of the same period. 'Life 
according to the form of the holy Gospel is situated on a level that 
is so distinct from that of the life according to the form of the holy 
Roman Church that it cannot enter into conflict with it',45 and 
consequently Francis could 'always give to the Church what is the 
Church's without polemic'.46 
To walk this road, to establish a community without law, prop-
erty or office, is to confront the question of what a law is in its 
most general sense: to live outside of law is not to repeal this or 
that statute or decree, but to dismantle the peculiar idea that life is 
something to which a rule or status of any sort might be 'applied'. 
As we will see, the means of accomplishing this task is to reveal the 
artifice of authority upon which law and office depend. But this is 
no easy task. Indeed, as Agamben makes clear, the real temptation 
that confronted monastic life was not the enticements of greed and 
lust, but the tendency to slip into strict codes of conduct and to 
police communal life in a mistaken attempt to preserve it: 
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The great temptation of the monks was not that which paintings of 
the Quattrocento have fixed in the seminude female figure and in the 
shapeless monsters that assail Antony in his hermitage, but the will to 
construct their life as a total and unceasing liturgy or Divine OfficeY 
Olivi and Paul 
In the final pages of the book, Agamben turns his attention to the 
work of the thirteenth-century Franciscan theologian, Pierre Jean 
Olivi, who brought the Franciscan way of life closest to its full con-
ceptual manifestation. What surfaces in Agamben's analysis is not 
only a testimony to the radicalism of Olivi's understanding of use, 
but a segue to a positive definition of form-of-life, which, up until 
this point in Agamben's own writings, in proximity with figures 
such as the homo sacer and the Muselmann, has been presented in a 
predominantly negative fashion. In other words, while figures such 
as the homo sacer introduce us to lives removed from the normal 
legal order, the manner of their exclusion is conditioned negatively 
in relation to the law's withdrawal, not positively in the absence 
of any relation to law. In the pages of The Highest Poverty, and 
especially in its final section, Agamben shifts the direction of his 
political intervention, taking us down a more prescriptive path, and 
Olivi marks one interlocutor who aids in this movement. 
What is at stake for Olivi in the texts Agamben cites is nothing 
short of an ontology of signs. Does a sign, or a status, or a right 
add something essential to the thing or person to whom it is 
applied? In Olivi's analysis of these questions, Agamben contends, 
'we see articulated, according to an intention that undoubtedly 
characterised Franciscan thought, an ontology that is so to speak 
existentialist and not essentialist'.48 But what does an existentialist 
ontology mean in this context? Olivi's inquiry concerns the degree 
of reality contained in socially constituted phenomena such as 
sacraments, offices and rights. Speaking generally of signs, Olivi 
writes: 
Insofar as you can consider them with subtlety and clarity, you will 
find that signification does not add to the real essence of the thing that 
is used as a sign anything other than the mental intention of those who 
have instituted it and accepted its validity and of those who accept it 
in action in order to signify and of those who hear it or receive it as a 
sign.49 
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All socially constituted phenomena exist, therefore, only within 
the domain of 'mental intentions', in the form of collective inten-
tionality, and never at the level of essences. An essentialist under-
standing of social phenomena, which, for instance, might attribute 
reality to the power of an office, is therefore simply the effect of 
having misperceived as real what is in fact only a sign. By contrast, 
an existential understanding follows from the ability to perceive 
within social phenomena the un-mystified, un-glorified, perceiver-
dependent process whereby humanity manufactures significance 
in the world. 50 
The conflict that Olivi and the Franciscans have with the law 
(or rather, their attempt to render the law inoperative) thus takes 
place on the level of the law's operational existence. And there-
fore, '[t]he conflict with law - or rather, the attempt to deacti-
vate it and render it inoperative through use - is situated on the 
same purely existential level on which the operativity of law and 
liturgy acts.'51 What Olivi suggests is, in fact, a profane ontol-
ogy - an awareness of the mundane operation that lies behind all 
that operates as if sacred. 52 'The sphere of human practice, with 
its rights and its signs, is real and efficacious', Agamben explains, 
'but it produces nothing essential, nor does it generate any new 
essence beyond its own effects. The ontology that is in question 
here is thus purely operative and effectual.' And so, he concludes, 
'[f]orm of life is the purely existential reality that must be liber-
ated from the signature of law and office or duty (ufficio ).'53 If 
one is able to genuinely understand how, through the projection 
of status, we come to create things like kings or gods - if one 
sees how this works - then the risk of attributing to a king or a 
god an essence lying beyond the social mechanics of their con-
struction is greatly reduced. Practically speaking, this entails an 
ongoing practice of exposing the immanent work of thought that 
is involved in producing something that functions as if it had an 
essence. 
However, rather than follow Olivi, who lays bare the nature of 
office and ownership by revealing them to 'have a reality that is 
only psychological ... and procedural', 54 the Franciscan polemi-
cists chose, as we have seen, to mobilise their claim along the more 
cautious juridical path separating use from ownership. This tactic 
undercut the profound novelty of their position and ultimately 
caused Franciscanism to become fixed within the order of the 
Church and canon law. Thus, '[w]hat is lacking in the Franciscan 
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literature', Agamben laments, 'is a definition of use in itself and 
not only in opposition to law. '55 
In pursuit of such a definition, Agamben invokes Saint Paul. 
Drawing from the extensive analysis he has undertaken of the 
Pauline literature, especially in The Time That Remains, Agamben 
sees in Paul's writings a strategic resource, certainly available to 
the Friars, which could have enabled them to break free from the 
purely negative and ultimately juridical defence of their ostensibly 
non-juridical way of life and manner of using. Paul's attempt to 
deactivate the law and to render the law inoperative through use 
is, Agamben explains (thereby bringing Paul into direct conversa-
tion with Olivi), 'situated on the same purely existential level on 
which the operativity of law and liturgy acts'. 56 By constructing a 
defence of use in exclusively juridical terms the Franciscans were 
prevented from discovering in Paul's writings, especially in the 
verses of I Cor. 7: 20-3 r, a theory of use which entails 'using the 
world as not using it or not abusing it (et qui utuntur hoc mundo, 
tamquam non utantur)', and which could have furnished a power-
ful argument against John XXII's theses on the use of consumable 
things as abusus. 57 
What we learn from Olivi is that the ontology of social catego-
ries is fundamentally a theory of use, which has the potential to 
remind us that we are always 'using' our social perception. It is for 
this reason, Agamben argues, that the Friars should have turned to 
Paul and to his notion of using 'as if not' using (hos me) to recover 
a theory of use designed to expose the purely functional, that is to 
say, existential, utility of social status. As we will see shortly, it is 
precisely this manner of awareness that I take to be the foundation 
of Agamben's notion of form-of-life. In its full and proper sense, 
form-of-life names the habit of putting into practice the Pauline hos 
me as a means of making visible what Olivi called our 'mental inten-
tions' so as to deactivate the social status and privilege it sustains. 
The Capuchin Constitution 
The Highest Poverty concludes with a two-paragraph chapter that 
begins with the following observation: 
What was lacking in the Franciscan doctrine of use is precisely the 
connection with the idea of form of life that Olivi's text seems to 
implicitly demand. It is as if the altissima paupertas, which according 
222 Agamben and Radical Politics 
to the founder was to define the Franciscan form of life as a perfect 
life (and that in other texts, like the Sacrum commercium Sancti 
Francisci cum Domina Paupertate, effectively has this function), lost 
its centrality once it was linked to the concept of usus facti [necessary 
use] and ended up being characterised only negatively with respect to 
the law. 58 
As we have seen, life defined by the practice of altissima pauper-
tas is a life lived outside the law and in accordance with a way 
of living for which the law has no terminology. Poverty, of both 
property and right, disarms law not by breaking it, but by refusing 
it - in the manner of a gift respectfully declined, or in the style of 
Bartleby's courteous refrain, 'I would prefer not to.' 
Although Agamben claims that the Franciscans failed to articu-
late this type of use, due to their 'preoccupation with constructing 
a justification of use in juridical terms',59 there is at least one place 
within the Franciscan literature where the Friars seem to be saying 
something very close to what Agamben denies of them. In the 
I 53 6 Capuchin Constitution (Le Constitutioni de' Frati Minori 
Cappuccini di San Francesco, corrected and revised in 1577), a 
text Agamben does not cite but which is absolutely central to the 
development and historical expansion of the Franciscan ideal, not 
only is all use understood in terms of necessary use precisely so 
that the legal bond between usage and ownership can be rendered 
inoperative, but the manner in which use is separated from the law 
appears to employ the strategy implicit in the Pauline hos mi. 'Let 
every Friar remember', the Constitution reads, 'that evangelical 
poverty consists in the firm resolution of not becoming attached to 
any earthly thing, of using the things of the world most sparingly 
as if compelled by necessity. '60 
Not by necessity, but as if by necessity. Recall that, according 
to Agamben, the fatal error made by the Franciscan polemicists 
in response to the Papacy was to turn to necessity and the natural 
law that it invokes. But the passage from the Constitution says 
something quite different. It does not instruct the monks to use 
only when their survival is at risk, but rather to use as they would 
as if their survival was at risk. In other words, use as if you were in 
a state of necessity, even though you are not. But, of course, under 
such conditions positive law does not formally recognise natural 
law at work. These are entirely different claims. From the point of 
view of the law the consumption of bread that is not one's own is 
Giorgio Agamben and the Practice of Poverty 223 
justified due to need, but in a different situation where one con-
sumes bread as if by necessity, no court would rule this justified. 
To put it simply, the law recognises by but not as if by.61 
But there is more. A few lines later we encounter a statement 
that expresses the Franciscan position in all its sophistication. 
'[W]e wish it to be understood', the Constitution continues, 'that 
we have in fact no jurisdiction, ownership, juridical possession or 
usufruct or legal use of anything, even ofthe things we use through 
necessity [ne anco di queUe, che per necessita usiamo].'62 Here it 
is stated with perfect clarity that even in those instances when 
the Friars do use by necessity (which natural law does justify), all 
claims to right of use granted under natural law are rejected. With 
these words, the drafters of the Constitution demonstrate a full 
awareness of the need to eliminate every connection to the law, 
including natural law, and explicitly adopt a means of achieving 
this that is strikingly similar to the Pauline hos mi. In doing so, they 
skilfully avoid, by means of a uniquely juridical form of poverty, 
the negative definition of use that Agamben identifies in other 
Franciscan documents. By rejecting outright the legal status of 
natural necessity, these passages appear to speak directly to what 
Agamben wants the Franciscans to say but yet seems to suggest 
that they have not said. Agamben's intuition that the Franciscans 
were doing genuinely radical and sophisticated work in conceiv-
ing a form of life beyond legality is correct, but the Friars seem to 
have taken this task further than Agamben either is aware of or is 
prepared to admit. 
Form-of-life 
In his opening lecture of 1978-9, Foucault includes a discussion 
of his method: 
What I would like to show is not how an error ... or how an illusion 
could be born, but how a particular regime of truth, and therefore 
not an error, makes something that does not exist able to become 
something. It is not an illusion since it is precisely a set of practices, 
real practices, which established it and thus imperiously marks it out 
in reality.63 
Then, in the final lecture of the year, Foucault returns to the theme 
with which he began, this time supplying terminology designed to 
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name it. Speaking of the nature of civil society, Foucault cautions 
that 'we should be very prudent regarding the degree of reality we 
accord to this civil society', not because it is not real, but because it 
is real in a way that is difficult to grasp and which can very easily 
slip through our fingers. 'Civil society', he writes, 'is like madness 
and sexuality, what I call transactional realities [realites de transac-
tion ].'64 What Foucault describes in these passages regarding his 
own research into the nature of madness and sexuality offers an apt 
depiction of Agamben's methodological intention as well and can 
be extended to his study of law and office. Law and office, together 
with the authority associated with each, are themselves realites de 
transaction, powers made manifest at the moment their status as 
effects of social perception disappears, replaced by an assumed 
natural order; and so to study them historically is not merely to 
depict them or to narrate them, but rather by accounting for their 
existence, is to thereby embark on the work of dismantling them. 
The deactivation of our transactional realities requires not a 
seizure of state power or the establishment of a radically new 
order, but the exposure of a reality that has always been at 
work. Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is a 
uniquely instructive resource in this regard, especially because 
its pages contain perhaps the best-known appearance of the term 
'form of life'. 65 Although Wittgenstein is speaking here specifi-
cally about language, his words are applicable to all forms of 
signification: 
We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must 
take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to say its 
purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of course, not 
empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the work-
ings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognise 
those workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The 
problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arrang-
ing what we have always known. Philosophy is a battle against the 
bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language. 66 
The problem Wittgenstein outlines is solved not by finding new 
ideas or by discovering superior content for thought, but by attend-
ing to the operation of thinking itself, that is, by observing thought 
at work. Philosophy, Wittgenstein shows us, is attention paid to 
the mind so as to reveal the process whereby we create a perceiver-
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dependent world, and in becoming aware of this work of creation, 
we begin to loosen the grip that categories of thought have on 
judgement. In order to achieve this insight, however, philosophy 
must .overcome not only the human inclination to misunderstand 
how thought works, but also the deceptively natural manner in 
which this misunderstanding appears to us, which is to say, in the 
form of understanding itself. When we become aware of this, and 
if this awareness can be sustained, form of life becomes form-of-
life, thereby ushering in a way of living that no longer projects 
onto the world an ontology of essence and transcendence, along 
with the privileges that these empower. 
In his early essay •Form-of-Life', Agamben addresses the subject 
of thought in a manner reminiscent of Wittgenstein, giving to 
thought a technical sense that places it in close proximity to 
form-of-life. 
I call thought the nexus that constitutes the forms of life in an insepa-
rable context as form-of-life. I do not mean by this the individual 
exercise of an organ or of a psychic faculty, but rather an experience, 
an experimentum that has as its object the potential character of life 
and of human intelligence. 67 
For Agamben, thought names not the exercise of the brain or a 
general faculty of mind, but rather the experience of cognition 
itself. 'To think', he continues, 
does not mean merely to be affected by this or that thing, by this or 
that content of enacted thought [i.e., to think is not simply to think 
within the constraints of the customs or forms of life we encounter], 
but rather at once to be affected by one's own receptiveness and expe-
rience in each and every thing that is thought.68 
To think, in other words, is to be and to remain aware of our own 
receptiveness and to be cognisant of the tendency to lock ourselves 
into modes of truth: 
only if living and intending and apprehending themselves are at stake 
each time in what I live and intend and apprehend - only if, in other 
words, there is thought - only then can a form of life become, in its 
own factness and thingness, form-of-life. 69 
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This also explains the lexical distinction Agamben draws 
between form of life and form-of-life. The hyphens do not erase 
form of life, destroy it or replace it, but make us aware of its being 
used, and in doing so render its most virulent force inoperative. 
When Saint Paul claims that during the time of the Messiah ordi-
nary law will not be replaced by a new law but will instead be ren-
dered inoperative, his understanding is akin to Agamben's notion 
of form-of-life. The law remains but now it is seen for the contin-
gent set of beliefs it is. And in a recent impromptu discussion held 
at the Embros Theatre in Athens, Agamben seems to corroborate 
this interpretation: 
We have to stop thinking of any revolutionary action as directed 
toward the constitution of a new juridical order. Benjamin calls this 
pure violence, which is a violence that will never constitute a new 
juridical order. You depose without restoring another. If you are 
really, strongly and dearly able to demonstrate the illegitimacy of the 
political order, in a way you are deposing it.7° 
Likewise, we are told in a passage from Benjamin, which Agamben 
often cites, the messianic world to come will be no different than 
the world as it is now. Rather, it is the way we comport ourselves 
toward this world that will change, and this is precisely the double 
vision that form-of-life aims to express. 
In his first book, The Man without Content, there is a short 
passage that seems to elegantly capture the problem that Agamben 
confronts with the notion of a form-of-life. He speaks of the prin-
ciple whereby 'it is only in the burning house that the fundamental 
architectural problem becomes visible for the first time'. 71 The 
general problem expressed in this analogy is, of course, how one 
reveals the constructed nature of those things that, for one reason 
or another, are taken as given. But the analogy also raises the 
more practical question of how we might observe the architecture 
of our house without having to burn it entirely to the ground. It is 
here that we encounter perhaps the greatest obstacle confronting 
Agamben's programme, namely, the risk that in dismantling our 
house we will introduce a profound ontological disorientation, 
drawing us to the brink of the vertigo we know as nihilism. While 
I do not have the space to fully engage this issue here - I have done 
so elsewhere72 - this represents a key juncture in Agamben's work. 
Herein we grasp the task of Agamben's project, namely, to openly 
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face the groundlessness of nihilism and to discover in it not a road 
to despondency but a path to happiness. In the past, Agamben has 
located this sentiment in Benjamin's short 'Theologico-Political 
Fragment' where the notion of happiness is linked not to perma-
nence, nor to perfection, but to transience ('The rhythm of this 
eternally transient worldly existence, transient in its totality, in its 
spatial but also in its temporal totality ... is happiness'73 ). Now, in 
The Highest Poverty, impermanence and contingency appear once 
again, extended to monastic life where the outcome of Franciscan 
poverty is neither resignation nor loss, but the achievement of a 
happy life, an •"apostolic" or "holy" life, which they profess to 
practice in perfect joy' .74 
What Franciscan life offers, although in an incomplete fashion, 
is an encounter with the problem of translating the contingencies 
of non-appropriative use into an ethos or way of living that claims 
no social or juridical foundation - a way of life to which Francis 
bestows the name poverty. Not poverty regarding material things, 
although the Friars certainly lived modestly, but rather poverty 
regarding those less tangible things, such as possession and privi-
lege, that mark out for us, today as well as in the past, the contours 
of our shared social reality - the real operation of which we are, 
in most circumstances, not even dimly aware. We are speaking 
here of a socio-political form of poverty and therefore its realisa-
tion cannot be accomplished independently. Just as the exercise 
of authority cannot be accomplished by a king in isolation from 
the obedience of those who bow before him, so too the realisa-
tion of poverty in the juridical sense cannot truly materialise in 
the absence of a community of practitioners. Which is why the 
common life of the monastics, and cenobitic life in general, is 
central to the possibility of Agamben's project: 'there where I am 
capable we are always already many (just as when, if there is a 
language, that is, a power of speech, there cannot then be one and 
only one being who speaks it.)'75 
Form-of-life, then, is a kind of form of life. It is a life that 
remains aware of its way of living as a way of living. And unlike 
all other forms of life, form-of-life takes as its principle stance an 
explicit awareness of the manner in which it functions or operates 
as a form of life. This is the particular ontological consciousness 
that form-of-life asks us to adopt and to retain. The habit of being 
aware of the contingency of our cognitive orientation is precisely 
what distinguishes form-of-life from any other form of life and, of 
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course, necessarily lurks within every form of life because every 
worldview is capable of bearing witness to its own profane con-
struction. In his use of hyphens, Agamben attempts to indicate 
lexically the notion that, although we cannot entirely escape our 
conventional worldview - our various forms of life that structure 
the social world and give it meaning- we can nevertheless recog-
nise its absolute conventionality and thereby operate differently 
with respect to the world we already have. 
Agamben's form-of-life urges us to never let rules become trans-
parent to their use, to never let use become dogmatic or proper, 
to never let laws disappear into operational neutrality, or lose a 
sense of their practical character and their instrumentality. What 
Agamben seeks in a form-of-life is a continual awareness of the 
forces that ceaselessly entice us to naturalise our use of things -be 
they words or laws, gods or kings- and he asks whether it is pos-
sible to conceive of a way of living that disarms these concepts not 
simply by replacing them, but by patiently exposing the machin-
ery of their operation. In the final instance, politics is a type of 
awareness, not of the minor and mundane adjustments that com-
prise juridical existence, but of the largely hidden attitudes that 
sustain that existence and determine the scope of what is valid 
within it. Our task, and the task of any politics understood as a 
form-of-life, is the sustained practice of exposing the effects of 
this awareness. I believe Giorgio Agamben's positive project rests 
on this insight. 
Postscript 
In the single paragraph that comprises the entire preface to Toilers 
of the Sea, Victor Hugo speaks of necessity, binding the yield of his 
pen to the pursuit of its understanding. Dividing necessity in three, 
he refers to a triple ananke, placing before us a preface that could 
very easily stand in as Agamben's own: 
Religion, society, nature; these are the three struggles of man. These 
three conflicts are, at the same time, his three needs: it is necessary for 
him to believe, hence the temple; it is necessary for him to create, hence 
the city; it is necessary for him to live, hence the plow and the ship. But 
these three solutions contain three conflicts. The mysterious difficulty 
of life springs from all three. Man has to deal with obstacles under the 
form of superstition, under the form of prejudice, and under the form 
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of the elements. A triple ananke (necessity) weighs upon us, the ananke 
of dogmas, the ananke of laws, the ananke of things. 76 
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